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Abstract—With the increasing number of network threats it
is essential to have a knowledge of existing and new network
threats in order to design better intrusion detection systems.
In this paper we propose a taxonomy for classifying network
attacks in a consistent way, allowing security researchers to focus
their efforts on creating accurate intrusion detection systems and
targeted datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-security is defined as the discipline concerned with
protecting networks, computer devices, programs and data
from different forms of attacks. Cyber-attacks could cause
data loss, allow attackers to access confidential information
or affect system or service availability. Research in this
domain focuses on detecting the attacks and on preventing
and predicting them. Although research in this field started in
the early fifties, it is an evolving domain [1].
The importance of research in this domain grow with
the increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) systems
to aggregate, transfer and send data to and from sensors. It
is predicted by CISCO that there will be 50 billion devices
connected to the Internet by 2020 [2].
Attacks are becoming more complex, targeting a wide
range of devices (industrial, personal, etc) [3]. Some attacks
focus on obtaining information without causing any damage
to a system, whilst some attacks cause damage either by
manipulating information or masquerading the attack to
access privileges maintain an access. Moreover, users are
becoming more aware of attacks and as a result systems are
now designed to be more secure [4]. Therefore, the current
iteration of strategic analysis tools and methods will no
more fit the need for threats detection and prevention. The
taxonomy of malicious traffic presented in this paper can
help researchers and software engineers to design up-to-date
detection tools and to find ways to prevent and predict these
attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows,
Section II highlights the need for new taxonomy focused on
network threats. Section III provides an insight on related
work, while in Section IV the taxonomy is described and
analysed, finally, the paper summarises with the conclusion
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Current rule based intrusion detection system only consider
a subset of known attacks to defend large enterprise networks.
Rule based intrusion detection systems rely highly on prior
detection of attacks and regularly updated rules [5]. While
these systems provide a first step to security, they do not enable
the detection of unknown attacks. Machine learning intrusion
detection systems on the other hand allow the detection
of unknown threats, however these system rely heavily on
existing training datasets, that may be outdated and leave out a
number of recent threats [6]. This problem underpins the need
for a taxonomy of attacks allowing researchers and engineers
to build better datasets [7].
III. RELATED WORK
The increasing number of threats has led to advances
in cyber-security. These systems however have numerous
drawbacks leading to systems being compromised. To this end,
researchers have published a number of taxonomies with the
aim to increase the overall efficacy of threat detection systems.
Zhu et al. [8] provide a taxonomy detailing the different
flaws and attacks against industrial SCADA systems. The
attacks are classified using the TCP/IP stack. Chakrabarti et
al. highlight the threats the Internet infrastructure is facing [9]
the attacks are illustrated through different scenarios. Hoque et
al. [10] provides a taxonomy of tools and systems against
network attacks, detailing the numerous tools used to identify
network flaws. The tools are described and then classified
with their pros and cons described.
While these taxonomies provide information on network
attacks, they focus on specific systems and tools. The
taxonomy presented in this paper focuses primarily on threats
that can be detected via an intrusion detection systems and is
aimed at researchers building datasets to ensure that relevant
attacks are included, hence, increasing the efficiency of future
intrusion detection systems that incorporate machine learning.
IV. TAXONOMY OF MALICIOUS TRAFFIC
The aim of this manuscript is to help researchers and
engineers to develop techniques to detect current and new
malicious traffic occurring on the network.The taxonomy
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presented in this work is composed of three control stages
(CS) representing attack steps taken by malicious users. Each
stage is then further composed of sub-stages that can be
either executed in parallel or subsequently during an attack.
An example of multiple sub-steps being subsequently being
executed is a malware taking advantage of a physical host
executing a buffer overflow in order to provide access to a
malicious user.
The taxonomy provided is designed to provide the end-
user with singular sub-components that can be added together
to represent a more complex attack.
Control Stage 1 : Reconnaissance The reconnaissance stage
is often the initial and the most important stage [11]. It is
used by malicious users to gather data on the target. The
data gathered by the reconnaissance inform both CS2 and
CS3. This stage enables the malicious user to learn critical
information about the target, through various passive and
active reconnaissance and obtain specific data such as
• IP Address Range
• DNS Records
• Mail Servers
Control Stage 2: Scanning Malicious users can gather critical
information about the network target by mapping the system
and the network. Important network components such as
firewalls, routers, etc, can be discovered. This task is often
realised by using a port scanner. The port scanner is designed
to try and target opened ports. Scanning, is an active step,
to identify network services running on a host; it also allows
the malicious user to test the network and the firewall for the
different security policies in place. This stage informs CS3.
Control Stage 3 : Attacks Whilst CS1 and CS2 can be
operated with relative stealth on the network, the attack is
essentially critical for the malicious user as both CS1 and
CS2 inform the choice of target (e.g. which server represents
the best target), which of exploit should be used to obtain the
best result, etc. Figure 1 provides a taxonomy of malicious
attacks that can be detected by analysing network traffic using
an intrusion detection system or deep packet inspection. The
attacks are classified in five different subsections described
hereafter;
TABLE I
PORT SCANNING RESPONSES
Category Description
Opened The target responded on a that the port,implying that a particular service is listening
Closed The target responded that all connectionsare denied on that port
Filtered / Blocked the target did not reply
A. Network
Network nodes are vulnerable to a large range of attacks.
Figure 1 (3.1) depicts common attacks on a network ecosys-
tem. DoS and DDoS attacks (3.1.1) and (3.1.1.1) can be
characterised by the large number of packets or requests
received by target with an intent to render it’s main function
unusable (e.g. Sending a high number of HTTP request on a
web server in an attempt to overwhelm the server and discard
legitimate connections) [12]. The Man in The Middle attack
(3.1.2) (e.g. ARP flooding attack). This attack attempts to map
the wrong MAC address with an IP address, allowing the
malicious user to redirect incoming and outgoing traffic and
snoop on the network conversation [13]. The packet crafting
attacks (3.1.3) highlights the possibility for an attacker to
replay or craft a new packet to bypass a firewall, test the
TCP/IP stack of network components, or replay a packet to
gain access to a network component [14]. The vulnerability
Scanning (3.1.4) is composed of all the methods used by
malicious attackers to scan a network for vulnerabilities with
known scanners such as Nessus, NMAP, OpenVAS, MBSA
etc. Vulnerability scanners can allow malicious user to detect
vulnerabilities and how to exploit them [15].
B. Host
As shown in Figure 1 (3.2), Host based threats encompass
infection of a host or its access through malicious intent.
Gaining Access (3.2.1) describes multiple methods to gain
illegal access using trojans (3.2.1.1) or backdoors for remote
access [16], password cracking (3.2.1.2) using tools such as
john the ripper to gain access to the target [17], or session
hijacking (3.2.1.3) to access the session of a legitimate user
using a replay attack [18]. Host based (3.2) attacks also
describe malware attacks (3.2.2) describing adware, sypware
and worms, as well as viruses (3.2.3) which is in itself a
malware, however has the ability to infect other hosts on the
network during execution.
C. Software
Figure 1 provides an overview of software based attacks
(3.3) that can be detected in network traffic. (3.3.3.1) SQL
Injection are commonly used to maliciously acquire data from
a database [19], (3.3.3.2) Buffer Overflow can be used to
access restricted data in memory, they can also be used to
gain root access on a computer, or for privilege escalation
(3.3.3.2.1) in order to maintain access on the target host [20].
Software can also be subject to misconfiguration such as the
symlink attack (3.3.4.1) on web servers or path transversal
attacks (3.3.4.2) that are used to access folders and files
outside the web root folder. Software can also be vulnerable
to input validation (3.3.5) attacks [21]. This attack requires
the malicious user to test different input fields to obtain error
messages and gain access either to a system, or to execute
code to obtain data.
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D. Physical
Network nodes are vulnerable to large range of physical
attacks, a number of these attacks are highlighted in Figure 1
(3.4). Physical attacks include physical back-doors added in
foundries that can be enabled remotely or through a specific
combination of events (3.4.3) [22]. Back-doors can also enable
remote-access hence be detected in network traffic. The data
obtained through the sensor should also be verified through
data provenance (3.4.1), a malicious user could spoof sensors
data, making end-users and operators believe in an event which
is not occurring [23]. Physical devices can also be prone
to misconfiguration leading to remote access, and data leaks
(3.4.2).
E. Human
The Human factor also plays a decisive role in network
security, without appropriate training and awareness [24].
Humans can also be seen as the weak link, hence, when
designing intrusion detection systems it is also important to
identify attacks against the end-users and expert-users [25].
As shown in Figure 1 (3.5.1) phishing and spear phishing
attacks. These attacks are designed to trick the user to provide
credentials or to allow a malicious user to access data without
its consent. Some of these attacks may be targeted to have a
higher probability of success.
F. Attack Examples
This paper, aims at providing a simple and concise taxon-
omy of network attacks, and to this end, Figure 2 provides
an example or recent attacks classified through our malicious
taxonomy. These attacks include the Mirai botnet (1.1.1) that
infected numerous IoT devices to launch distributed denial
of service attacks against numerous Internet provided and ser-
vices [26]. It also includes the Tiny Banker Trojan (4.1), which
was active from 2012 to 2016 targeting financial institutions
stealing data from the users [27]. Whilst these attacks are
reported in the media, they are often excluded from training
datasets.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper a taxonomy of network threats for intrusion
detection systems is presented. The taxonomy is divided into
three control stages in order to describe more complex attack
processes. The aim of this work is to create a taxonomy with
the ability to inform researchers developing both intrusion
detection systems and training datasets in order to increase the
detection accuracy and decrease the false positive rate. With
the increasing number of connected systems and networks the
taxonomy aims at facilitating the design of future defense
mechanisms as well as robust systems.
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